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Definition of Death | Brain Death
and End-of-Life Ethics Links
Abstracts of the 2nd INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON BRAIN DEATH
(Havana, Cuba)
February 27-March 1, 1996 The Full Program of the Meeting is also available

Note: These abstracts need a lot of
editing. Plase bear with us till we get them cleaned up.

BRAIN ONTOGENESIS. THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE HUMAN BEING AND
PERSON
Julius Korein
USA
The difficulties encountered in medicine in utilizing concepts
relating to life and death in the human organism are related to
inappropriate fundamental definitions. Fundamental
characteristics and evolution of living systems are discussed. A
set of biological definitions based on the life cycle of the
human organism is presented using a dual approach. Mutually
exclusive sequential stages of the life cycle, as well as
incrementally inclusive (nested) phases of the life cycle in the
human organism are both explicitly defined. A brain centered
approach requires emphasis on the ontogenesis of the structure
and function of the brain. Operational definitions lead to a
characterization of the different developmental periods of the
human organism including phases designated as the "human
being" and the "person". The brain centered
concept is use to define the onset (brain life) and termination
(brain death) of this critical system of the human being. The
onset and termination of the human being occurs respectively with
the beginning of the operation of the entire critical system
(brain life), and with the end of the operation of the entire
critical system (brain death). The onset is related to completion
of the structural brain and the beginning of its function, while
the termination is related to the destruction or irreversible
dysfunction of the entire brain. These concepts contain a
fundamental asymmetry. A self-consistent, practical, biologically
based approach may provide a logical foundation for a large
variety of medical, legal, ethical and social issues. Some of
these topics are discussed using the proposed framework,
including brain death, persistent vegetative states, abortion,
and anencephaly. Key words: ontogenesis, life death, organism,
life, cycle, human being, person, brain, stages, phases,
persistent vegetative states, abortion.

A DEFENSE OF THE HIGHER BRAIN FORMULATION OF DEATH
Karen Gervais
USA
A definition or concept of death is a convention, a social
construct that derives from metaphysical and value assumptions
that can be clarified, analyzed, and criticized. Any criterion
used to determine death presupposes a concept of death. Hence,
one way to assess a criterion (e.g., the brain death criterion)
is to surmise its underlying concept of death and ask what
justifies this understanding of death, metaphysically and
ethically. We rely on the measurement of the cessation of
"vital" physiological functions to legitimize the claim
that someone has died. Therefore, the use of technological
stand-ins for these functions requires the question: Is the
patient alive or dead? particularly when functions historically
deemed "vital" persist despite irreversible,
substantial loss of brain function. Significant agreement exists
that brain death is human death. I shall argue that the
metaphysical and ethical considerations supporting the use of the
brain death criterion actually entail a consciousness-centered
(higher brain criterion) concept of death; that worthy
metaphysical and ethical arguments support a consciousness-based
definition of human death, and that the pluralism of metaphysical
and ethical perspectives among us should be honored by permitting
individuals to choose to be declared dead on the basis of a
higher brain death criterion.

DEATH AND THE RISE OF MEDICINE AS A SCIENCE
C.A. Defanti
1st Neurological Department, Ospedali Riuniti di Bergamo ITALY
As many historians have shown, the contemporary controversies
about the ascertainment and definition of death (Is brain death
really death? Is there any degree of uncertainty in its
diagnosis?)are not an entirely new phenomenon: doubts about what
the "signs of death" are and about the ability of
physicians to make a correct "diagnosis" of death have
always existed. These doubts have not been dispelled by the
development of modern medicine: on the contrary, they have grown
during certain periods of the history of the last three
centuries. The panic over premature burial during the Age of
Enlightenment is well known, but the causes of this social
phenomenon are not well understood. However, as R. Pernick has
shown, probably the development of the first, rudimentary
resuscitation techniques along with the new knowledge about
suspended animation in lower animals and the earliest experiments
with electricity, raising the possibility to reverse states like
death or death itself, were of paramount importance. During the
Nineteenth Century, these controversies weakened, in parallel
with the medical progress (the invention of diagnostic tools as
the stethoscope is a case in point), but during the last decades
of the same Century new controversies and doubts grew up,
resulting in a new wave of panic. Here too, the scientific
advances were instrumental: the possibility to keep organs alive
in the laboratory, outside the organism, and later the
possibility to culture cells and tissues "in vitro" and
to transplant organs from an organism to another blurred the
boundaries of death. Other social factors have probably been
influential in this movement: for instance the rise of the non-
orthodox medicine, of the anti-vaccination and anti-vivisection
leagues. During the Twentieth Century, the medical progress
initially contributed to dispel some doubts about death, through
the introduction, in medical practice, of diagnostic tools as the
EKG, which made the ascertainment of cardiac arrest wholly
reliable, but after the Second World War the development of
intensive care medicine blurred the boundaries of death again and
forced the medical societies to propose new criteria of death.
The famous paper issued by the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee (1958)
had an enormous impact and gained worldwide acceptance, except in
some countries, like Israel and Japan, where religious and
philosophical perspectives still resist again this concept.
Despite the large success of the concept of brain death, many
doubts are lingering. At variance with the past, the point is no
longer the diagnostic uncertainty, but the foundation of the
concept itself. A growing number of scholars are embracing the
concept of cortical death, whereas some, among them P. Singer, a
former proponent of cortical death, think that a reversal to the
old "cardiovascular" criteria is more advisable. Many
factors are involved in the contemporary debate: they range from
purely scientific issues (e.g. the difficulty to make a reliable
diagnosis of permanent vegetative state), to moral quandaries
concerning transplantation of organs and to philosophical puzzles
about the definition of death.

NEW CONTROVERSIES IN THE DEFINITION OF DEATH
Stuart J; Youngner, M.D
University Hospitals of Cleveland, 2074 Abington Road, Cleveland.
USA
While brain death remains widely accepted in the United States
after nearly three decades since its introduction medical
progress, clinical experience, social change, new methods of
organ retrieval, and unresolved conceptual issues have provided
significant challenges to its early, almost unchallenged status.
One of the reasons brain death was quickly accepted was that
patients who met its criteria suffered irreversible asystole
within a short time. Now, however, there are examples of brain
dead patients being supported on ventilators for months and even
years. Also, while brain death criteria call for irreversible
cessation of all brain function, many persons who are declared
brain dead retain significant brain functions such as production
of arginine vasopressin. Tolerance of differing beliefs in a
multicultural society has led the State of New Jersey to adopt a
law which allows families to veto the declaration of brain death
on religious grounds. These challenges will be reviewed with an
eye to their implications for the future for countries now
struggling to "catch up" by adopting and implementing
traditional brain death criteria.

IN DEFENSE OF WHOLE-BRAIN DEFINITIONS OF DEATH
A.A. Howsepian, M.D.
University of California, San Francisco
Fresno Central San Joaquin Valley Medical Education Program USA
The primary thesis that I shall undertake to defend is this: All
functions of the entire brain must be irreversibly lost in order
for a (developmentally mature) human being to be dead. This is,
by some lights, a remarkable undertaking. Robert M. Veatch, for
example, finds such an undertaking to be literally incredible,
for he imagines that, far from defending this thesis, no one
really believes any such thing. According to Veatch, the
"whole-brain definition of death" so construed, as well
as related wholebrain definitions, have sustained irreparable
conceptual damage at the hands of their critics and, hence, ought
to be discarded. But the death of whole-brain definitions of
death (WBDsD) has been grossly exaggerated. I intend to argue
that, contrary to appearances, (i) critics of WBDsD including,
among others, Veatch, D. Alan Shewmon, Michael Lockwood, and John
H. Sorenson, have not presented an even remotely plausible case
against their conceptual viability and (ii) the alternative
(higher-brain-oriented) definitions of death advanced by Veatch,
Lockwood, Shewmon, Sorenson and others are so defectively
conceived that even if WBDsD were in conceptual disarray, we
would have no good reason to adopt any extant higher-brain-
oriented alternative.

REFRAMING THE DEATH DEBATE: FROM NEW JERSEY, NOW ENTERING THE
MORIBUND ZONE
Alan J. Weisbard
University of Wisconsin
USA
Over the past quarter century, technological developments in
medicine, particularly in the areas of artificial respiration and
organ transplantation, prompted a societal reconsideration of the
meaning of death, as well as a revision of both legal and medical
criteria for determining whether and when the death of an
individual had occurred. The resulting "redefinition"
of death in terms of "whole brain death" was viewed as
a great triumph of the bioethics movement. The new definition of
death has itself influenced, in complex and often unacknowledged
ways, the highly value-charged behaviors of foregoing
life-sustaining treatment and removing organs from donors for
purposes of transplantation. The "whole brain death"
formulation has recently come under increasing attack from a
number of quarters, and momentum is gathering for a new round of
"redefining death". This presentation will explore the
lessons of our earlier experience with redefining death, and
suggest that the impending "next round" take a new
direction, both in our conception of the meaning of death and in
the legal, policy and behavioral implications that flow from it.
This approach would recognize both the biological reality of a
"zone of moribundity" and the moral reality that we are
attached to competing and perhaps irreconcilable, visions of
"personhood" and "biological life" as
constitutive of human existence. Building on and extending the
innovative approach pioneered by the New Jersey Bioethics
Commission, the presentation will explore the conceptual and
policy implications of permitting specified "death
behaviors" to be initiated within this zone of moribundity,
in accordance with the wishes and values of the individual
patient.

SOMATIC INTEGRATIVE UNITY: A NONVIABLE RATIONALE FOR
"BRAIN DEATH"
D. Alan Shewmon
655 Levering Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90024
USA
The term +brain death + was introduced in the late 1960s
primarily in response to the increasing feasibility of organ
transplantation. Initially there was little agreement concerning
the meaning of the term, and many experts did not equate it with
death. Nevertheless, pragmatic pressures led to the neurological
revision of laws on death before any true consensus was reached
concerning the reasons why +brain death+ might be death. Post
facto attempts to rationalize the legislative changes have
followed one of basically two lines of argument: +brain death+ is
death because it entails either (a) the loss of somatic
integrative unity or (b) the loss of personhood. The latter
rationale has been consistently rejected by the mainstream as a
radical re-conceptualization of death rather than as a
neurological instantiation of it. For nearly two decades, the
former position has been accepted as +party-line+ and parroted by
the medical and legal communities, largely without critical
analysis. It is argued here that the notion of the brain as the
+integrating organ+ of the body is contradicted by clinical
evidence, and that loss of somatic integrative unity occurs only
after some critical point in the irreversible progression of
multi-system, not purely neurological, failure.

DEATH OF THE PERSON OR DEATH OF THE ORGANISM?
Daniel Wikler
Professor, University of Wisconsin Medical School Three rival
definitions of death have occupied center stage in the debates of
recent years: the traditional cardiopulmonary definition, the
"whole brain" definition (and its brainstem variant);
and the "higher brain" definition based on capacity for
consciousness. The "whole brain" definition has won
nearly universal endorsement by governments and medical
organizations, but some groups continue to insist on
cardiopulmonary definitions, while a number of scholars have
supported a higher brain definition. What, precisely, is the
dispute about? Is there any biological claim which one group
affirms and the others deny? Or, if there is agreement on the
neurophysiology of death, do the groups differ on moral issues?
One possible interpretation of the dispute is that adherents of
both the cardiopulmonary and whole- brain definitions of death
are defining death of the BODY, while adherents of the higher
brain definition are defining death of the PERSON. If this is the
case, there is no real disagreement on the definition of death.
They might both agree on what defines death of the body and what
defines death of the person, while disagreeing on whether law and
clinical practice should be based on death of the body or on
death of the person. A more recent line of argument, however,
holds that there is (and can be) but one death, death of the
ORGANISM, and any definition of death which does not define death
of the ORGANISM is conceptually confused. I believe that this
perspective logically implies that cardiopulmonary death is the
single defensible definition of death. However, I defend the
higher brain definition against its two alternatives.

Calixto Machado, M.D., Ph.D. (CUBA)
Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery, Havana, Cuba E.mail:
braind@infomed.sld.cu
There are three basic schools about the definition of human
death: Those centered on how much of the brain needs to be dead,
before a person can be declared dead on neurological grounds?
Those referring to the "loss of specifically human
properties" and those arguing the "loss of integrative
unity of the body". Regarding the first school, there are
three subdivisions: whole brain, brainstem death and higher brain
formulations of death". The second school has been
powerfully defended by Veatch, who proposed to search for the
essential properties that characterizes life in humans:
"What is it about human life, and that its loss is so
essential, that the individual who loses it ought be called
dead?" According to the third school, Bernat has proposed to
"define death as the permanent cessation of functioning of
the organism as a whole". Some authors combine these main
schools when presenting their definitions of human death. It is
discussed that consciousness, with its neural framework
delineated in the so-called reticular formation-cortex unit,
provides the essential human attributes, and it is the most
integrative function of the organism. As a conclusion, a new
definition of human death is proposed, that answers and
integrates the three brain-oriented schools on the definition of
death. Responding to "how much of the brain needs to be
dead, before a person can be declared dead on neurological
grounds?", the answer is: the irreversible destruction of
the so-called reticular formation-cortex unit. Answering to those
referring to the "loss of specifically human
properties", the irreversible loss of consciousness
(capacity and content) abolishes the essential human attributes.
Replying to those arguing the "loss of integrative unity of
the body", consciousness is the most integrative function of
the body, ordering intra and extra-brain functions. There is only
one kind of human death: "The irreversible loss of both
components of consciousness, arousal and awareness".

NON-HEART BEATING CADAVERS AND THE DEFINITION OF DEATH
Robert Arnold
Division of General Internal Medicine, Center for Medical Ethics,
University of Pittsburgh
USA
Recent proposals aim to increase the donor pool by using patients
declared dead by cardiopulmonary, rather than neurological-
oriented criteria. These patients are referred to as non-heart
beating cadaver donors (NHBCDs) because their hearts are no
longer beating at the time of procurement. Investigators have
developed various methods for limiting warm ischemia and
increasing the viability of the organs procured from NHBCD. These
include in situ preservation using cold perfusant, restoration of
cardiopulmonary function after "death" with CPR,
bypass, or total body cooling , or rapid retrieval after death
following withdrawal of life sustaining treatment. While these
policies may increase the donor pool, they raise various ethical
problems. This presentation will concentrate on the problems
NHBCD raise regarding the determination of death. NHBCD policies
highlight current confusion regarding the role of
"irreversibility" in the definition of death and the
lack of empirical data underlying the cardiopulmonary criteria.
The policies also point out the current paradox that one may be
declared dead in the United States using cardiac criteria but
alive by neurological criteria. By moving the declaration of
death as close as possible to the moment when cardiopulmonary
function ceases, NHBCD risk taking organs from patients who are
not yet dead.

Brain Death and
Technological Change: Personal Identity, Neural Prostheses and
Uploading
James J. Hughes
University of Chicago
The death at issue in the brain death debate is not an empiric
reality, but a social category, "social death." It is a
question of which bodies we are comfortable using and disposing
of in certain ways, and not comfortable giving medicine or food
as if they were "alive." Until recently both mind and
body stopped functioning at the same time, and this
"death" and "social death" were generally
seen as one phenomenon. There were important exceptions, however,
in many cultures where particular diseases and disabilities
earned a social death definition before the physical death had
occurred.
In the modern world, whole brain definitions of death arose as a
result of the technological deconstruction of death as a unitary
phenomenon. The whole brain definition was at the outset a
compromise between those who prefer a neocortical definition, and
those who prefer the whole body definition. This paper argues
that the whole brain definition of death is an unwieldy,
historical compromise which will unravel as 21st century
technologies permit the repair, replacement and manipulation of
body, and especially brain, tissue. These technologies will
present anomalies to the whole brain definition which will force
us towards, and then beyond, a neocortical definition of death.
New biological and cybernetic technologies will make clear that
social life is properly attributed to any biological system with
a particular set of subjective experiences - personhood. These
technologies will also create tremendous material incentives for
the living to stop treating the permanently unconscious as
socially alive.

MUERTE ENCEFALICA. EXPERIENCIA CAMAG\EYANA EN EL BIENIO
1993-1994
Angel La Cerda Gallardo; Sergio Vega Basulto;
Rubiel Lopez Delgado; Ingrid Melendi Alvarez Hospital
"Manuel Ascunce Domenech", Camaguey CUBA
Se realiz" un estudio de 57 pacientes con el
diagn"stico presuntivo de muerte encef lica, en el servicio
de Neurocirug!a del Hospital "Manuel Ascunce Domenech"
de Camaguey, durante el per!odo enero 1993 a diciembre de 1994.
Los pacientes fueron sometidos a examen neurol"gico repetido
y a investigaciones que permitieron comprobar el diagn"stico
de muerte encef lica. Presentaron alto valor predictivo la
abolici"n de todos los reflejos de tallo cerebral, la prueba
de la atropina, hiperventilaci"n apneica, oculograma
cal"rico, el registro electroencef lico y la angiograf!a
cerebral. El trabajo describe todo diagn"stico
m s que permite valorar indirectamente el estado de la
circulaci"n cerebral. Se propone un algoritmo que describe
la din mica utilizada en nuestro servicio y que entre otras
ventajas incluye la validaci"n del diagn"stico cl!nico,
adem s de demostrar utilidad para su uso por un sistema nacional
de trasplantes en la identificaci"n de posibles donantes.

NEUROPATHOLOGICAL EVIDENCES IN PATIENTS CLINICALLY JUDGED TO
BE IN STATE OF BRAIN DEATH
Fusahiro Ikuta; Shigeki Takeda
Department of Pathology, Brain Research Institute, Niigata
University
JAPAN
Japanese 84 autopsied patients were pathoanatomically
investigated and what had happened in their brains and spinal
cords before the judgment was evaluated. 1) Severe increased
intracranial pressure (IICP) induced by edema or swelling with
secondary hemorrhages involving the brain stem tegmentum was
observed in all the brains without exception. Some showed very
severe and rapid IICP due to acute edema and swelling caused
mostly by liver dysfunction or injury, and the brain stem
tegmentum revealed only microscopic hemorrhagic foci. This means
cessation of cerebral blood flow had followed immediately after
the hemorrhages; the red foamy blood cells in and around the
blood vessels showed autolysis similar in intensity. 2) Autolysis
was observed in all brains, most severely in the brain stems, but
not in the visceral organs (Vos). This and 1) indicate that
cerebral blood flow had unexceptionally ceased at least in the
brain stem tegmentum before the judgments. The brain stem had
first fallen into death since autolysis never occurs before death
of cells. 3). Like the Vos, the spinal cord still vividly lived
even after the judgments. 4) Many neurons of the hypothalamus
lived for 3 to 4 days even after the judgments.

THE CASE OF RESPIRATOR BRAIN AFTER INTRACRANIUM INJURY
T. Sawaguchi; S. Nakamura; O. Ohue; M. Kobayashi; A. Sawaguchi
Department of Legal Medicine; Department of Pathology, Tokyo
Womens Medical College, Tokyo
JAPAN
A case of an intracranial injury suffered in a fall is reported
here. The patient fell down and knocked his head in an accident
during the filming of a television program. He was admitted to
the hospital and remained on a respirator for one week before
expiring. No operation was performed. The legislative autopsy was
performed because this was considered to be a case of involuntary
work-related manslaughter. Brain softening was apparent in the
brain stem and the cerebellum. Red blood cells in the blood
vessels appeared foamy after autolysis. Microglias appeared in
places. On the cerebellum granule cells appeared status bullous.
In another case, maintained under mechanical ventilation for one
and a half months after a traffic accident without intracranial
injury, the autolysis of the brain was less than in this case.
Generally, it was supposed that in cases of respiratory
maintenance with intracranial injury the autolysis and necrosis
of the brain occur faster than in cases without intracranial
injury. This was true in this case.

ESTUDIO CLINICO PATOLOGICO DE LA MUERTE ENCEFALICA.
EXPERIENCIAS DEL HOSPITAL PROVINCIAL "SATURNINO LORA"
DE SANTIAGO DE CUBA
ctor N#$ez Gil; Noya Moya Gonzalez;
Mabel Blanco Granda; Aurelio Rodr!guez Fern ndez Hospital
Provincial "Saturnino Lora", Santiago de Cuba CUBA
Se presenta la experiencia del Hospital Provincial
"Saturnino Lora" de Santiago de Cuba, en el estudio
cl!nico patol"gico de la muerte encef lica. Se estudiaron 27
casos ingresados entre los a$os 1994 y 1995. En el 74,07% se
realiz" extracci"n de "rganos. El grupo et reo m s
afectado fue entre 20 y 29 a$os con 15 pacientes, para un 55,55%
y predomin" el sexo masculino con un 81,5%. Los traumatismos
craneoencef licos en general fueron las causas m s frecuentes,
destac ndose, entre ellos, la contusi"n cerebral severa con
un 33,3% y la contusi"n primaria de tallo encef lico con un
25,9%. Diez casos (37,03%) permanecieron en muerte encef lica
entre 1 y 5 horas, un paciente se mantuvo hasta 36 horas. La
sepsis respirtoria con un 52% fue la morbilidad asociada m s
frecuente. La tomograf!a axial computarizada y los estudios
radiol"gicos simples fueron las pruebas imagenol"gicas
m s realizadas. Se destacan entre los hallazgos
anatomopatol"gicos el edema cerebral severo presente en el
ciento por ciento de los casos de necropsias.

MUERTE ENCEFALICA. APLICACION DE CRITERIOS CUBANOS DE
DIAGNOSTICO
Matilde Estrada Suarez;
Efra!n Chiv s Ponce;
s
Hospital Cl!nico Quir#rgico "Dr. Luis D!az Soto", La
Habana CUBA
Al aceptar el estad!o cl!nico muerte encef lica como una nueva
forma de diagn"stico de la muerte del ser humano, tiene gran
importancia al permitir obtener "rganos y tejidos para ser
utilizados en trasplantes, mejorar el estado psicol"gico de
familiares y personal de la salud relacionados, as! como
disminuir los gastos en aquellos pacientes sin posibilidades de
recuperaci"n. Se realiza una evaluaci"n del uso de los
criterios cubanos para el diagn"stico de muerte encef lica
en los pacientes con coma arreactivo, atendidos en la Unidad de
Cuidados Intensivos de adultos de nuestro hospital durante los
a$os 1993 hasta 1995.

MUERTE ENCEFALICA EN UTI. EXPERIENCIA DE 2 A%OS EN EL
HOSPITAL "ARNALDO MILIAN CASTRO" DE VILLA CLARA
Mario A. Dom!nguez Perera; Armando Caballero L"pez; rez;
Mauro L"pez Ortega;
Roberto Valledor Trist
Hospital "Arnaldo Mili n Castro", Villa Clara CUBA
Durante el per!odo comprendido entre enero de 1994 a diciembre de
1995, ingresaron 259 pacientes en coma en la UTI del Hospital
"Arnaldo Mili n Castro" de Villa Clara, de ellos, 50
(19,3%) evolucionaron hacia la muerte encef lica. Los criterios
diagn"sticos utilizados fueron eminentemente cl!nicos y
fueron los siguientes: 1) coma de causa conocida, sin ning#n tipo
de respuesta, excluyendo formas reversibles de coma; 2) ausencia
de reflejos de tallo encef lico; 3) prueba de la atropina
negativa y 4) test de apnea positivo.
falo, el diagnostico se confirm" con EEG y/o `PETC. Las
causas m s presentes fueron los traumatismos craneoencef licos de
cirug!a sobre el SNC, 8 pacientes (16%). Predomin" el sexo
masculino (68%) y el grupo de edad m s afectado fue el
comprendido entre 45 y 59 a$os (32%). De los 50 pacientes con
muerte encef lica, 25 donaron sus "rganos.

MUERTE ENCEFALICA EN EL HOSPITAL "ARNALDO MILIAN
CASTRO" DE VILLA CLARA (SEPTIEMBRE-91 A DICIEMBRE-95)
Mario A. Dom!nguez Perera: Leonel Fuentes Herrera; rrez
Ronquillo; Mauro L"pez Ortega; Rafael Cruz Abascal Hospital
"Arnaldo Mili n Castro", Villa Clara CUBA
Durante el per!odo comprendido entre septiembre de 1991 y
diciembre de 1995, se diagnosticaron 176 casos de muerte encef
lica en el Hospital "Arnaldo Mili n Castro" de Villa
Clara. De ellos, 73 casos (41,4%) correspondieron a ingresados en
la UTI y 103 (58,6%) en la UCI. Los criterios diagn"sticos
utilizados fueron: 1) coma de causa conocida, sin ning#n tipo de
respuesta, excluyendo formas reversibles de coma; 2) ausencia de
reflejos del tallo encef lico; 3) prueba de la atropina negativa
y 4) test de apnea positivo. En dos casos con coma sin
destrucci"n falo, el diagn"stico se confirm" con
EEG y/o ETC. Las causas m s frecuentes de muerte encef lica
fueron el trauma craneoencef lico y la enfermedad cerebrovascular
hemorr gica con un 37,5% y 35,8% respectivamente; predomin"
el sexo masculino con un 67% de los casos y el grupo de edad m s
afectado fue el comprendido entre los 45 y 59 a$os de edad
(31,8%). De los 101 pacientes con muerte encef lica
diagnosticados a partir de enero de 1994 en este hospital, 46
(45,5%) donaron sus "rganos.

BRAIN DEATH IN CROATIA
Aksentijevich Dragand and Dubravka Sepic Grahovac CROATIA
Research is critical review of brain death diagnostic criteria in
world and in Croatia. During period from 1984, until 1991, 117
patients were observed in Anesthesiological and Reanimatological
Department of Rejika Hospital. These characteristics were taken
from medical history of each patient: diagnosis, age, sex,
specificity of neurological examination, electroencephalographic
pattern, cerebral angiography, scintigraphy, computerizated
tomography, atropine and apnea test, and other valid information.
Also, it was observed duration of irreversible coma; decision
specification of Ad Hoc Commission was analysed with
confrontations that were present when Commissions members tried
to get permission for organ donation. Information was correlated
with regression analysis as statistical method. Diagnosis of
brain death was made after 60 h (2, 5 days) in reanimation area.
Age, sex, level of consciousness expressed with Glasgow Coma
Score (GCS) were without influence on duration of coma
irreversibility. Electroencephalographic isoelectric pattern that
was registered three times, after six hours interval, was main
criteria for brain death diagnosis decision. Spinal reflexes
sometimes were present when isoelectric pattern and obstruction
of cerebral circulation was found. Spinal reflexes were not so
important for decision and diagnosis of brain death. Maximal
correlation was found between isoelectric
electroencephalogram and absence of brain reflexes; some
electroencephalograms have had positive correlation with atropine
test (r=0,002). These results are important for support of
conception that death of brain stem is death of whole brain. That
concept can save time for diagnostic duration and hospitalization
of patients on artificial ventilation and on that way indirect
increase number of potential donors. Organ exploitation for
donation in analysed population of irreversibility coma was low
(44,4%). Limited donation is not expression of uneducated
populations level about problems of organs transplantations and
transplantation medicine. Emotional reactions of patients family
were the most important reasons for so low level of donations
when they don't want to believe that their brain death member is
"object of society" (res communitatis).

CRITERIOS PARA EL DIAGNOSTICO DE LA MUERTE ENCEFALICA EN EL
HOSPITAL UNIVERSITARIO "GENERAL CALIXTO GARCIA".
(MODIFICADOS) 1996
Armando Gonz lez Rivera; Armando Cabrera Rojo;
Lionel D!az Rodriguez
Hospital "General Calixto Garc!a", La Habana CUBA
En el hospital "General Calixto Garc!a" centro que
mayor n#mero de casos de muerte encef lica diagnostica anualmente
en Cuba, se realiza un revisi"n de los criterios
diagn"sticos de muerte encef lica ajust ndose a las
condiciones actuales de la instituci"n, definiendo las
precondiciones de evaluaci"n: paciente en coma profundo;
paciente ventilado en modalidad controlada; existencia de una
lesi"n encef lica capaz de producir da$o irreversible,
completamente documentada y sin respuesta favorable a los
tratamientos recomendados; ausencia de causas reversibles de
depresi"n de la funci"n encef lica. Se puntualizan los
criterios cl!nicos y se hacen consideraciones sobre el coma
arreactivo, la ausencia de reflejos integrados en el tronco encef
lico, la negatividad de la prueba de atropina, la apnea
comprobada mediante la prueba de oxigenaci"n apneica cnica y
definici"n de par metros
tricos y de tiempo) y el criterio de irreversibilidad. n se
definen los criterios para las pruebas instumentales:
electroencefalograma, potenciales evocados multimodales,
panangiograf!a cerebral, tomograf!a axial computarizada con el
uso de contraste, todos aplicables a los pacientes que no
presentan una alteraci"n estructural encef lica primaria, a
quienes tienen contraindicada la prueba de oxigenaci"n
apneica y a algunos casos complejos de lesiones aisladas
infratentoriales. nes realizan la certificaci"n de la
muerte encef lica.

ALGUNOS RESULTADOS EN RELACION CON LA MUERTE ENCEFALICA EN
UNA UNIDAD DE CUIDADOS INTENSIVOS NEUROQUIRURGICOS
Alejandro D. Jorr!n Sim"n; Armando E. Gonz lez Rivera
Hospital Universitario "General Calixto Garc!a", La
Habana CUBA
Se trata de un estudio descriptivo que relaciona los fallecidos y
la muerte encef lica (M.E.) en la U.C.I.N.Q. del Hospital
"General Calixto Garc!a", donde se ingresaron 20
pacientes, el 75% con trauma craneoencef lico grave, todos con
Glasgow de n ventilatorio y/o
hemodin mico, teniendo una mortalidad de 50%, llegando el 70% de
los fallecidos a la M.E. con edad promedio de 42,8 a$os y ndose
como donantes multiorg nicos cinco de ellos, siendo rechazados
dos por hipertensi"n arterial severa. De los cinco pacientes
que sufrieron lesi"n craneoencef lica por accidente en
ciclo, fallecieron 4 (40%) y todos llegaron a la M.E. (57,1%),
as! como el 66,6% de los que ingresaron por accidente vascular
encef lico hemorr gico. Seis de los fallecidos (60%), ingresaron
con Glasgow en tres puntos y 4 de ellos llegaron a la M.E.
(57,1%). Ingresaron cinco pacientes con nivel de lesi"n
protuberancial o por debajo de este, todos fallecidos en M.E. Las
complicaciones m s frecuentes en los pacientes en M.E. fueron las
arritmias cardiacas, la herniaci"n trancalvaria, la
hipopotasemia y la hiperglicemia en tres casos respectivamente.
La asociaci"n de edema, contusi"n cerebral y hematoma
subdural estuvo presente en tres de los casos con M.E. (28,5%) y
en tres de los fallecidos que no llegaron a la misma, siendo la
asociaci"n de diagn"sticos m s frecuentes entre los
#ltimos la contusi"n y el edema cerebral, que estuvo
presente en el 50%. La estad!a de los pacientes con M.E. fue
menor de 2 d!as en todos los casos y de tres o m s en el 66,6%
del resto de los fallecidos.

DIAGNOSTICO DE LA MUERTE ENCEFALICA Y MANEJO INTENSIVO DEL
DONANTE
E. Medina Herrera; R. Aguilar Casanovas; F. Dura$ona Roque; s
Instituto Superior de Medicina Militar "Dr. Luis D!az
Soto", La Habana
CUBA
Se presentan los resultados obtenidos en el tratamiento intensivo
y el diagn"stico de la muerte encef lica (ME) en 10
pacientes recibidos en la Unidad de Traumatolog!a. En todos los
casos se cumplieron las medidas de soporte vital establecidas en
el manejo intensivo y se realizaron pruebas cl!nicas,
neurofisiol"gicas e imagenol"gicas seg#n criterios
cubanos para el diagn"stico de la ME. Entre los principales
resultados se observaron: valor m!nimo de 3 puntos en la Escala
del Coma de Glasgow; nivel de disfunci"n neurol"gica
protuberancial o inferior, no respuesta a ica y vestibulares
cal"ricas. La angiograf!a carotidea present"
detenci"n intravascular de la columna de contraste. En los
estudios neurofisiol"gicos realizados se observ"
abolici"n del potencial evocado visual con preservaci"n
del electrorretinograma, adem s de la existencia de silencio
electrocerebral en el electroencefalograma. Se intervinieron
quir#rgicamente
6 pacientes previa autorizaci"n familiar. De los 12 ri$ones,
s"lo dos no fueron #tiles. En el estudio
anatomo-patol"gico de lulas "no viables".
Los 10 ri$ones #tiles fueron implantados en diferentes dicas del
pa!s, con una sobrevivencia del 90% de los pacientes receptores
renales. La causa de muerte del receptor renal fallecido no est
relacionada con el trasplante renal.

NEUROANATOMIA FUNCIONAL DEL TRONCO ENCEFALICO Y SU
IMPORTANCIA EN LA DETERMINACION DE LA MUERTE
J.M. Cuba
Instituto de Ciencias Neurol"gicas, Lima PERU
Siguiendo a la embriolog!a, en el tubo neuronal se desarrolla una
primera envoltura que cubre el Canal Neuronal o Central Grey
Core" (Szentagothai). Luego, el "core reticular" y
en fin la "envoltura de integraci"n". Estas tres
envolturas las encontramos en la neuroanatom!a funcional y las
denominaremos: Arqui-tronco a las que corresponden las
formaciones nucleares vegetativas y que se extienden hasta el
hipot lamo, y en el rea postrema, estas tienen funciones en la
bioqu!mica de la sangre, cardiacas, respiratorias, digestivas,
con el dolor y aprendizaje. Si esta rea se lesiona ocurre la
muerte. El Paleo-tronco, es el
rea en donde mediante m"dulos especializados ocurren los
fen"menos de la relaci"n del hombre con el mundo
exterior. Si esta rea se lesiona se pierde esta relaci"n.
Por #ltimo, a la "envoltura de integraci"n" la
denominamos Neotronco. Es la n
n en los
estudios del desarrollo del sistema nervioso de los sistemas
arquineuronal, paleoneuronal y neoneural. Nuestras deducciones
cl!nicas se apoyan en las observaciones cl!nicas desde comienzo
de siglo. En fin, las #ltimas investigaciones de la neuroqu!mica
tica, apoya la tesis de que el tronco cerebral en el hombre es el
rea en donde est inscrita su personalidad.

TWO STANDARDS OF DEATH IN DENMARK. DEATH IN DENMARK IS EITHER
CARDIAC DEATH OR BRAIN DEATH
E.O. Jorgensen
Medical Department P, The Copenhagen City Hospital, Bispebjerg
Hospital, DK-2400 NV.
DENMARK
Criteria of brain death had been disputed in Denmark for more
than 20 years when the Danish Parliament in May 1990 finally
passed a law on declaration of death, postmortem examination and
transplantation of organs. The new law introduced criteria of
brain death as supplementary to the criteria of cardiac death. A
memorandum issued by a task-force appointed by the Danish Medical
Association introduced the new code to the medical profession
with the following statements :(a) it is now legally accepted to
forego treatment of brain dead patients, (b) treatment by heart
and liver transplant is made possible, and (c ) the result of
kidney and pancreas transplant surgery is expected to improve. In
the early 1970's Danish medical scientists had created a fund of
knowledge on brain death which contributed significantly to the
thinking about brain death in other countries. Criteria of brain
death could have been introduced in Denmark at that time but it
did not happen. Actually, Denmark became the last of the European
countries to legalize criteria of brain death. In my opinion,
brain death was recognized with such an extreme delay and two
sets of criteria of death legally recommended because (a) the
statute on brain death had been discussed and proposed together
with a new law on transplantation, and because (b) reactionary
minority groups who had great authority argued strongly against
the reappraisal of the concept and criteria of death.

SPINAL MAN AFTER BRAIN DEATH
THE UNILATERAL EXTENSION-PRONATION REFLEX OF THE UPPER LIMB AS AN
ULTIMATE INDICATOR OF BRAIN DEATH
E. O. Jorgensen
Medical Department P, The Copenhagen City Hospital, Bispebjerg
Hospital, DK-2400 NV.
DENMARK
Definition and diagnosis of brain death. Brain death is defined
by the irreversible cessation of brain functions. Two decades
ago, it was commonly stated that the diagnosis of brain death
could only be made when repeated clinical investigations had
established irremediable losses of both cranial nerve reflexes
and electrocortical activity and serial cerebral (four vessel)
angiographies had demonstrated no venous filing within the brain
to ascertain that conditions for brain life were no longer
present. Nowadays, it has become widely accepted that the
critical component of brain death is death of the brain stem;
and, that brain stem death is reliably diagnosed at the bedside
when specific requirements are fulfilled : (a) The patient must
be unresponsive and on a ventilator as a consequence of a know
structutal brain lesion, (b) reversible cause of brain stem
dysfunction (such as drug intoxication, hypothermia and metabolic
disorders) must be excluded, and (c) each of two examinations
separated by hours must show no cranial nerve reflex activity and
persistent apnoea; neither EEG nor cerebral angiography are
needed. However, the diagnosis of brain death can be ascertained
by a simple test for autonomous spinal activities which are
unique in the sense that they emerge exclusively after brain
death: the unilateral extension-pronation reflex of the upper
limb as an ultimate indicator of brain death.

THE BRAIN DEATH STATE IN MEDICAL SCIENCES
K. Takeuchi and T. Shiogai Department of Neurosurgery, Kyorin
University
School of Medicine, Mitaka, Tokyo 181, Japan
Since H. Cushing originally described the state of brain death in
1902, in terms of the field of medical science, brain death has a
history of nearly one full century. In many cases, since the
brain death state frequently follows severe increased
intracranial pressure, nearly every neurosurgeon has experienced
it. In addition, neurologist, emergency care physicians and
intensivists may also experience the brain death state. It is
unlikely, however, that all clinicians will encounter this
condition. Thus, there are still a significant number of persons
even in the medical profession that lack a correct awareness of
this condition. Needless to say, there is even greater confusion
among members of general public. In Japan discussions on brain
death have not progressed yet, since our first and only occasion
of heart transplantation in 1968. The same ideas are repeatedly
taken up over and over again. As the authors themselves have
witnessed the course that has been followed thus far, we have no
choice but to think that a similar situation will most likely
continue in the future as well.
